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1. Introduction: contemplating or judging reason?
This paper will  propose an interpretation of Kant's thought based on an analysis of the well-
known Kantian metaphor of the "Tribunal of Reason".1  By so doing, it will be argued that the 
activity of reason is not foundational,  but jurisdictional.  The task of reason is not to form the 
foundation of  our  frameworks of  theoretical  and practical  knowledge,  but  rather  to form their 
legitimation.  In  addition,  it  will  be  argued  that  the  non-foundational  character  of  reason  is 
consistent both with its ultimate autonomy and with its established proceedings. These are of a 
jurisidictional  nature:  the  procedure  of  transcendental  deduction.  In  other  words,  the  non-
foundational character of reason does not imply that reason itself  is indeterminate and vague 
(and therefore absolutely useless).
Kant believed that the critical task of reason was to single out and legitimate some  a priori 
frameworks in our theoretical and practical knowledge. These frameworks constitute the syntax 
of knowledge. But do they enjoy unconditioned necessity?
If we answer that the a priori  frameworks are unconditionally necessary, then Kant's reason, 
which discovers  and legitimates  them, plays a foundational  role.  In this  case,  Kant's  reason 
would not be very different from idealistic reason, which plays a foundational role and is identical 
with reality. Indeed, it would presuppose an actual and necessary presence of these essential 
and indispensable  frameworks.  But  this  answer  implies that  Kant's  critical  work  is altogether 
obsolete in the present day, because it considers the patterns of a particular scientific and ethical 
formulation as necessary and unavoidable. Therefore, if we question Newton's physics, which 
Kant appeals  to,  or some contents of  his ethics,  we cannot help imputing to Kant the same 
metaphysical dogmatism that he intended to avoid.2
However,  Kant  may  be  read  in  a  different  way.  The  reason  that  copes  with  the  task  of 
legitimating the validity of the a priori frameworks of our theoretical and practical knowledge does 
not prove they are unconditionally necessary, but only that they are conditionally  necessary. In 
other words, legitimating them does not show that the  a priori  frameworks enjoy a  necessary 
foundation, but  only that they are  possible under some conditions. The first answer supposes 
that the foundation of the  a priori frameworks is a  quaestio facti.  The second answer, on the 
contrary, assumes that it is a quaestio iuris. In other words, reason does not ground the a priori 
frameworks, but legitimates their claims from reason's own point of view: that of a reflective and 
autonomous faculty. Indeed, only a reflective and autonomous faculty is able to question itself 
concerning  the  legitimation  of  our  cognitive  tools.  If  these  tools  were  necessary  in  an 
unconditioned manner, there would be no need for us to choose, debate and justify them.
In its work of legitimating our  a priori frameworks, reason attributes to them a conditioned 
necessity, similar to the legal one. It is not an absolute necessity, but a necessity relative to a 
particular  perspective  and  particular  proceedings.  In  recent  years  such  an  interpretation   of 
Kant's thought has been developed by Lyotard, Kaulbach and Onora O'Neill. They all agree to 
attribute a jurisdictional  and reflective character to pure reason3.  And Kant himself  uses the 
"Tribunal of Reason" metaphor.4
Two contending parties appeal to a court or a tribunal when they set up conflicting claims. But 
the  parties  agree  to  settle  their  quarrel  in  a  legal  manner,  namely  by  following  particular 
proceedings and a particular syntax. The very fact that there is a quarrel implies that neither 
claim enjoys an unconditioned necessity. And the one that follows from the decision of a court is 
only a conditioned necessity, namely an obligation valid only within a legal system. One may ask 
why Kant would prefer this weak necessity in his theory of knowledge?
Before  answering  this  question,  it  is  worth  emphasising  that  the  "Tribunal  of  Reason" 
metaphor  is  revolutionary.  By  it,  reason  is  no longer  a  contemplating  theoria,  but  a  judging 
faculty. Contemplating reason characterised Western metaphysical tradition and was based on 
the priority of actuality. By contrast, Kant's judging reason is founded on the priority of possibility. 
By the actuality of a thing, we mean that the thing itself is present, has come into effect, has 
fully developed. Conversely, by possibility we refer to the notion of being merely probable, at a 
time other than the present, or other than in the on-going experience. 
Before Kant, the Western metaphysical tradition rested on the supremacy of actuality in two 
fundamental  realms.  The first  was  in the  prime principles  of  knowledge,   the second in  the 
ontological framework of things. Positions of the Aristotelian scholastic mould can, in this regard, 
be considered paradigmatic. That is, the prime principles of knowledge and reality are actual in 
the sense that they are always and necessarily present as the basis of any form of knowledge, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  disregard  them.  Furthermore,  as  far  as  the  structure  of  things  is 
concerned,  the actual  is  logically  stronger  than the  possible.  The act  is  the condition  of  full 
realisation of a thing. And so it is possible to speak of virtual being, still in fieri, only when there is 
a presupposition of an actual being that is fully realised.5
This is the point of view of a contemplative reason. Our theoretical and practical principles of 
knowledge can be seen as well-founded when it is demonstrated that they are actual and always 
necessarily present in our knowledge. However, for a judging reason, this demonstration is not 
enough. In its perspective, we have to show that they are possible, namely that we can deduce 
and legitimate them within a fixed frame of reference.
Why does Kant use the "Tribunal of Reason" metaphor? Why is it no longer enough for him to 
establish  that  we  de  facto use  certain  cognitive  tools?  This  paper  suggests  the  following 
responses: Kant needs a judging reason because he realises that the rationalists and empiricists 
of his time present two kinds of actuality, which are in conflict with each other. The rationalists 
believe knowledge to be founded upon rational principles that are actual; always present and 
necessary. In opposition to this view, the empiricists believe that the evidence constituting the 
elements  of  knowledge  is  furnished  by  experience,  in  a  manner  likewise  actual  and 
unquestionable. Who is right? To answer this question, reason had to become a tribunal, which 
evaluates the legitimacy of conflicting claims.
A Tribunal cannot decree that one party is right simply because a certain behaviour is actual, 
in that it is the predominant habit in society. Thus Kant draws a distinction between the critique of 
reason, and an empiricist physiology of knowledge. (i.e. the explanation of how people know, 
which says nothing about the legitimacy of the framework of knowledge).  Further, a tribunal is 
not  a  power  that  imposes  itself,  as  does  Machiavelli's  new  prince,  but  rather,  a  tribunal  is 
legitimated as an organ of the Law.
Kant's critical reason is a derived, third organ that does not create, but gives an orientation. 
Yet, the deliberation of the Tribunal can occur only because the Tribunal puts forward, by itself, a 
law that is not included in the claims of the parties, but is issued by the Tribunal itself. The right 
ascertained by the Tribunal, however, is not something that is "discovered" in extant customs 
and precedents already formed. Thus the Tribunal of reason can be compared not so much to a 
common law court, as instead to a special constitutional tribunal. 
Indeed, a common law court represents an institution that is also law-making at the same 
time. Hence it is not a mere bouche de la loi, and it acknowledges its own submission to an ideal 
of the law. This ideal is something other than the court's mere will, even though the only organ 
that discovers and issues this law is the court itself. Nevertheless, this type of tribunal, whether 
resting exclusively on a precedent, or acknowledging the role played by habit, presumes a state 
of  legality  already granted and unquestioned.  The Kantian Tribunal  of  Reason,  on the other 
hand, has to face a state of conflict and anarchy caused by a crisis of the traditional rules, and 
has to work out the very framework of its own legitimacy. Declaration of these new structures of 
legitimacy cannot boil down to the assumption of full power or the designation of a new prince, 
but must include the rules through which the claims of litigants can be settled. To achieve this, 
the constitution issued by the Tribunal should be procedural and open.
Any court enforcing a  sham legitimacy to cover up  de facto  power would not be complying 
with its duty and would abase itself, becoming the prince's organ of propaganda. Thus among 
the essential characters of the Tribunal of Reason, autonomy and submission to a standard of 
legitimacy and legislation should be key features.
Kant's reason, if it is read according to the Tribunal metaphor, is a regulative reason, which 
inserts claims of knowledge - or more precisely, of different types of knowledge - into structures 
of legitimation. Since it is not creative, its task is not  to criticize the reality of different pieces of 
knowledge, but rather their possibility. It should legitimate and systemize their structures, so that 
they  may  be  unitary  and  reciprocally  compatible.  Any  Tribunal  which  made  decisions  in  an 
episodic  and  asystematic  manner,  influenced  by  the  moods  of  judges,  would  not  be  a  true 
Tribunal, but rather would be an arbitrary body. Likewise, a Tribunal making decisions based on 
other  people's  statements  would  be  equally  arbitrary.  A  judge  is  called  upon  to  show  both 
independence  from  different  demands  and  submission  to  the  Law:  briefly,  judges  must  be 
autonomous. This is what Kant says in What Is Orientation in Thinking?.
Freedom of thought also implies submission to the sole laws that reason applies to itself. The opposite is 
the maxim of unruly [gesetzlos] usage of reason. If reason refuses to submit to its self-imposed laws, it 
follows, quite naturally, that it will have to abide by the laws someone else has made. Without the existence 
of some law or other, nothing, not even the greatest absurdity will last for long. The inevitable upshot of this 
loose thinking [Gesetzlosigkeit] is explained here [Jacobi],  as a liberation from the bounds imposed by 
reason. Because of such behaviour, freedom of thought will eventually be lost. Since misfortune is not to 
blame for this loss, but rather conceit itself, freedom of thought, in the true sense of the words, is seriously 
at stake.6
Reason itself,  which seeks conditions and evaluates possibilities, is not inherently unconditioned 
and necessary. Reason can never operate without presupposing itself and its own autonomy. And 
any reason that was driven by something else would cease to be reason. It would become,  to quote 
a Kantian simile,  "no more than a roasting spit"7.   But it  should be emphasised that for Kant's 
reason,  the  need  to  presuppose  itself,  as  a  datum  which  cannot  be  systematised,  as  an 
insurmountable critical instance, is a kind of finiteness, rather than an absoluteness8. The critique of 
reason answers the question "What can I know?", "What ought I to do?", and "What may I hope?"9 
This critique cannot answer such questions as "Why do I know?", or "Why should I be moral?". The 
bare fact of being in existence and of posing oneself questions does not imply any foundational 
activity. Kant's reason is subject, as it were, to Gödel's theorem: it can account for everything, but 
in it is contained an undecidable element, namely itself.
This weakness is also, at the same time, a strong point, because it  is evidence of the non-
metaphysical character of Kant's reason. Reason is not a system given once and for all, but is a 
process. Thus, the form of legislation can be attributed to it, but it has no necessary content. Kant 
speaks of the Beruf jedes Menschen, selbst zu denken10 in his  What Is Enlightenment?. Reason 
has the character of a vocation, almost as a religious calling. It is a strictly personal calling that is 
impossible to impose or define from the outside, because it is something that can be evaluated only 
by the person concerned. In  the place of  necessity,  Kant  poses autonomy of  thought and the 
framework of its conditions and possibilities.
It is worth pointing out that Kant's reason is autonomous and non-foundational, but cannot be 
reduced to an indeterminate principle that is compatible with any paradigm. Indeed it uses a well-
determined and accurate procedure - transcendental deduction - which is the direct result of the 
autonomy and legislative power peculiar to reason itself.  Therefore, this paper will  now analyse 
some transcendental deductions in Kant's work, to show that a non-foundational reason cannot be 
reduced to a loose principle, so that, as it were, all cats are equally grey in the night.11
2. Deduction in the work of Kant
The  interpretation  of  Kantian  thought  that  is  being  presented  is  anti-idealistic.  The  idealists 
interpreted Kant's reason as an actual principle, potentially logical and ontological. But herein,  we 
presume instead that reason is a reflective rationality of the juridical type; a process, in itself finite, 
of an organization of possibilities and limitations. In fact, one of the most important subjects, albeit 
of a more strictly juridical origin, of Kant's thought is, indeed, deduction. 
The  term  deduction,  in  Kant's  language,  is  derived  from  jurisprudence  and  indicates  the 
demonstration of the legitimacy of determinate claims, as distinct from proof of matters of fact.12. 
The most agonizing and famous deduction is the transcendental deduction contained in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. The object of this deduction is the legitimation of the cognitive use of categories of 
understanding.  The  question  that  makes  deduction  necessary  is,  in  brief,  as  follows:  some 
instruments of knowledge - called by Kant categories 13 - have been recognised as not deriving from 
experience, but from our understanding. So then we may wonder whether it is legitimate or not to 
use them in the cognitive sphere. 
This query is not groundless, but may be raised only because two circumstances of fact are 
considered as given: on the one hand, sensible intuitions; on the other, categories of understanding. 
It could be maintained that the crisis of univocality of evidence revealed by the opposition between 
empiricism and rationalism is  re-proposed through this  duality.  Sensible  experience cannot be 
deduced - in a logical sense - from categories, nor, on the contrary, can be categories from sensible 
experience.  Hume  had  been  absolutely  clear  about  this 14. Thus  a  legitimation,  called 
transcendental deduction,  is needed to show how a unitary cognition can be furnished even though 
two types of reciprocally independent evidence are present. On the side of sensibility we have a 
virtually infinite manifoldness; on the side of understanding, we find a finite number of categories. 
But will the latter be of any use? 
The task of  legitimation presupposes,  at  least  as  focus imaginarius,  an unity  of  cognition. 
Without this presupposition, conflict between rationalistic and empiricistic evidence would not even 
exist.  Thus,  if  the problem of  legitimacy in  using categories is  to  be discussed, a subject  or 
substratum must be presupposed as ready to recognize both types of conflicting evidence as its 
own. Should this recognition fail,  the conflict  could not even occur. Kant calls this substratum I  
think, for the very reason that it is not an "unconscious " stage on which representations are held. 
Rather, it is something active, which operates and recognises the representations as its own. 
The conflict between sensible and intellectual evidence can be proposed only if both can function 
in  concert  with  each other.  Further,  the conflict  can only  be proposed if  the  virtually  infinite 
manifoldness offered by sensible evidence is made intelligible by categories. This must be done in 
such a fashion that this evidence may even, if need be, oppose the results, whose acquisition and 
classification by understanding have so far been taken for granted.
It  should be stressed that transcendental deduction develops through a series of hypothetical 
conditions. So, if  the conflict is to be settled, we have to presuppose a virtual unity of cognition and 
subjectiveness in which this cognition occurs and whose unifying functions must be categories. In 
conclusion,  the  I  think  is  not  an ultimate,  actual,  unavoidable  type  of  evidence but  rather  a 
possibility introduced by an "if". It is not the foundation of reality and rationality, but only a logical-
cognitive condition. This condition should be able to accompany cognition according to categories, if 
we wish that such a cognition be unitary and therefore subject to discussion and criticism. The 
hypothetical condition of the I think, though, determines neither the type of categories nor the type 
of representations. It only requires that they be recognizable, unifiable and systematizeable, besides 
being, as far as categories are concerned, unifying and systematizing.
Hegel's reading of this deduction was instead a metaphysical one - as if Kant had intended to 
deduce, in a logical sense, the table of categories from the necessary reality of the I think. Hegel 
therefore judged the Kantian undertaking to be ruinous. He maintained that there was no connection 
between the ego, as unity of self-consciousness, and the categories which were to be the unifying 
functions of its cognition. Instead,  he maintained that the connection remained a merely empirical 
one. The Hegelian critique would be pertinent if this transcendental deduction were metaphysical, if 
it intended to deduce categories from the actuality of a self-consciousness which legitimates itself 
because it is a source, at the same time, of reality and cognition. But in relation to the instruments 
of  thought,  Kant  does not  pose the  metaphysical  question  of  their  "reality",  namely,  of  their 
connection with the structure of things, but rather the "juridical" question of their validity and their 
use  (Chiodi 1961, 10-13).
Whereas idealists harkened back to a concept of  foundation as actuality,  necessary reality, 
unconditionedness; Kant, dismissing metaphysics, conceived of foundation as condition and limit. 
By reducing Kant to a metaphysicist,  the idealists treated him as though he had transferred the 
function of logical-ontological foundation, in the traditional sense, to the subject. And as if  Kant 
subsequently failed in the attempt to determine the categorical structure of the subject, taking the 
latter's necessary and unconditioned productivity as a starting point. On closer inspection, however, 
it becomes clear that from Kant's point of view such a demonstration would be worthless. Even if 
one  succeeded in  demonstrating  that  categories  are  the  necessary  structure  of  the  subject, 
inasmuch as the latter  is cognisant and self-conscious, their cognitive use would by no means be 
legitimated (Chiodi 1961, 21-59). Who can say whether these alleged necessary frameworks are not 
the anatomy of dream? Who can assume that through them we may know?
To Kant's mind, the question to be posed is different, namely: on what conditions and within 
what limits can we use a given function in a legitimate manner? To put it another way: an ultimate 
and ever-present - because unavoidable - foundation of cognition and reality is, from a Kantian point 
of view, something with very little significance. Indeed, if this ultimate and unavoidable foundation is 
actually operating as such, then every mode of cognition lies within it and cannot escape. What then 
is  the  use of  engaging ourselves  in  consideration  of  such a  matter?  If  it  is  an unavoidable 
foundation, we cannot in any case do without it. Thus It would seem more fruitful to be concerned 
with possible and avoidable foundations; it is these that require demonstration and legitimation, for 
the very reason that we can do without them.
The fundamental  thesis  of  this  reading of  Kant  is  that  the traditional  notion of  foundation 
accounts for possibilities by tracing them back to the unique and unconditioned order of absolute 
reality.  But  Kant  traces  necessity  back  to  the  varied  and problematic  order  of  conditions  of 
possibility and the several spheres of validity opened up by them (Chiodi 1961,13 ff). Thus, several 
deductions can be singled out in Kantian thought, according to the type of concept and sphere of 
validity to which they refer. For instance, Kant draws a distinction between laws of nature and laws 
of  liberty,  and endeavours to  show that  explanatory  concepts  of  theoretical  cognition  do not 
consistently suit the realms of law and ethics. In general, the issue of deduction arises because an 
automatic and inevitable necessity does not occur. Deductive reason would be meaningless in the 
realm of the necessary, and the actual, but it  functions, like a Tribunal, within the sphere of the 
possible. The unconditioned - Kant maintains - cannot be thought of without contradiction.  First, let 
us clarify what is meant by transcendental deduction in general.
Hegel,  as has already been mentioned, interpreted Kantian deduction as if  its  goal was the 
determination  of  categories  in  their  totality  and  necessity  and in  their  relationship  with  self-
consciousness15. However, Kant raises the problem of deduction after, and not before, expounding 
his categories. Deduction does not endeavour to justify the relationship between categories and 
unity of self-consciousness, but rather the relationship between any type of a priori determination 
and  the  possibility  of  the  corresponding  object.  In  the  case  of  transcendental  deduction  of 
categories, it is a question of the relationship between these and the corresponding object. The fact 
that the need for deduction arises reveals that the relationship is not absolute, but is only possible. 
Hence its conditions of validity, which are subject to being contravened,  must be shown (Chiodi 
1961, 33-38).
Since it pertains to the instruments of our cognition, transcendentality of deduction is one of its 
analytical characters. A thing cannot be legitimated empirically, on the basis of a physiology of 
cognition. Similarly, a Tribunal could not declare a type of behaviour legitimate merely because of 
its  diffusion in  society.  In  short,  deduction is  the main characteristic  distinguishing the critical 
philosophy of Kant from either empiricist or rationalist approaches. It is impossible to legitimate an 
a priori form empirically. And  similarly, the attempt to extract an object from logic proves fruitless.
Transcendental deduction rests on the distinction between quaestio juris and quaestio facti; the 
right and scope of the claims of our pure concepts are not contained analytically in the fact. Thus 
Kant, although still  expressing himself  as if  the formal  order of thought was natural,  brings its 
conditions into question, from a non-naturalistic point of view (Chiodi 1961, 38-44). The fact that the 
concepts to be legitimated do exist and are in use does not automatically entail the legitimacy and 
validity of their use. The statement that categories are inherent in the physiology of our cognitive 
faculties provides no help at all when trying to clarify whether and to what extent resorting to them 
for knowledge can be sanctioned.
The concepts of philosophy express a field of claims which should have their foundation not in 
exhibition of their necessity, but rather in the display of their legitimate possibility. Kant draws a 
clear distinction, in his  Critique of Judgement, between Feld or field  (the sphere of claims of a 
concept, independently of the possibility  of its  foundation),  Boden or territory (that part  of field 
where such a possibility exists), and Gebiet or dominion (that part of the territory where validity is 
real, i.e. wherein it genuinely refers to possible things) 16. On the same territory, different dominions 
can co-exist, according to the conditions of validity that form the legitimate use of a concept. For 
instance, both intellectual legislation of nature and rational legislation of liberty exert their dominion 
over experience, according to whether the prospect of explanation or that of moral and juridical law 
is adopted (Chiodi 1961, 50-52). 
To illustrate the significance of transcendental deduction, let us briefly consider the the pure 
concepts of  understanding, i.e.  categories.  The issue regarding this  deduction is  basically  the 
vexing question of the relationship between our representation and the object (Chiodi 1961, 72). 
How can we rest assured that conformity exists between these two terms? To this question three 
traditional metaphysical solutions had been given; but they were dismissed altogether by Kant, as 
early as February 21, 1772,  in a letter to Marcus Herz: 17 
- relationship of an active subject with a passive object (intellectus archetypi), on whose intuition 
the facts themselves are founded; 
-  relationship  of  an  active  object  with  a  passive  subject  (intellectus  ectypi)   whose 
representations are completely determined by the influence of their object;.
-  operation  of  an active  God upon a  subject  and an object,  both  passive  (Malebranche's 
occasionalism).
The  first  two  solutions  are  dismissed  by  Kant,  as  they  presuppose  an  absolute  and 
unconditioned action,  whose inexistence is  confirmed by the mere presence of  two conflicting 
interpretations  of  intuition.  An  absolute  and  unconditioned  action,  immediately  laden  with 
conceptual content, could not even be brought into question. The third solution, the occasionalistic 
one, is discarded because it entails a vicious circle, since the deux ex machina that takes care of 
harmonizing cognisant with cognised is introduced by the same cognitive faculty, which needs to be 
legitimated.
These three traditional solutions have in common the explanation of the relationship between 
representation and the object with a scheme of the cause and effect type. What is assumed as 
prius, whether it be God, or the cognisant subject, or the object offered by experience, is treated as 
a foundation. This foundation has the characters of unconditionedness, because it  is the  prime 
cause of presentiality and necessity  inasmuch as it cannot be otherwise than what it is. Even for 
Kant, foundation and necessity coincide, but necessity and unconditionedness do not. One can 
speak of foundation only in relation to types of legitimacy, which are to be determined in each case, 
according to particular conditions of validity  (Chiodi 1961, 81).
To put  it  another way,  traditional  metaphysics justified,  or  better,  explained, the conformity 
between representation  and the  object,  by ascertaining the  presence of  a  logical  prius,  of  a 
foundation which functioned as a prime cause. Thus, two mistakes were made. In the first place, 
metaphysics treated itself as an external object; it reasoned as if on the one hand it knew the object 
independently of the object's representation, and on the other, as if it knew the representation itself.  
Secondly, metaphysicst took for granted that the category of cause could be appropriately used to 
define the relationship between cognition and representation.
Kant's reason is,  instead, a reflective reason that submits its  own possibilities and limits to 
criticism. And since it is reflective, it  is not at all capable of treating itself as if it could see itself 
from the outside, as an object of  experience. Thus, the problem for  reason is  not that of  the 
impossible exhibition of an absolute foundation, but rather that of a criticism which can clearly 
establish how and when its own categories are to be used. In this case, for instance, how and when 
to use the categories of cause. Therefore, the problem of deducing categories is divided into the 
following points (Chiodi, 1961, 88):
1. there exist a priori concepts of understanding;
2. the ascertainment of this fact poses the problem of their legitimacy and conditions of use;
3. any demand for legitimacy is a claim for necessity;
4. any claim for necessity requires deduction for determinaton of its conditions;
5. if a plan existed in which necessity and unconditionedness coincided, no deduction would be 
possible. But since we can speak of necessity only when determined conditions are concerned, i.e. 
from given points of view and given prospects, the metaphysical universe shatters into a myriad of 
images of the world. The tribunal of reason judges on the basis of a few fundamental principles that 
imply its own autonomy and desire for unity and systematicity,  but which rests on a plurality of 
potential codes.
In  the second edition  of  Critique of  Pure  Reason (1787),  Kant  formulates the problem of 
deducing categories  as  a  problem of  logical/transcendental,  not  psychological  possibility  of  a 
general unification. The foundation of unification is represented by unity insofar as it is a possibility: 
"Das: Ich denke muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können." (It  must be possible for the 'I 
think' to accompany all my representatio)18
In order for  the manifoldness of  sensibility  to be the object of  a cognition,  a unification is 
required. This, in turn, demands a unity that functions as a substratum. This unity, on the other 
hand, cannot be furnished  a parte objecti:  indeed, it  is impossible to demonstrate that what we 
experience  is  in  itself  unitary  and  consistent,  mainly  because  today's  experience  could  be 
contradicted by tomorrow's  experience.  So this  unity  is  to  be sought  a parte subjecti,  in  the 
relationship between the self-consciousness of the I think and all the other representations. 
Each manifoldness of intuition has a necessary relationship with the I think, in the same subject 
where this manifoldness is met. Such a relationship is expressed by the muß begleiten Können.
Schopenhauer (1938, I: 535) criticized this statement by saying that with one hand it took back 
what it gave with the other. It was, to his mind, a modally ambiguous statement, because it was 
both apodictic (i.e. unconditionally asserted to be necessary: "muβ") and problematic (expressing a 
mere  possibility:  "können").  It  seems,  then,  that  Kant's  thesis  is  subject  to  two  different 
interpretations, depending on whether the "muß " or "können" is stressed. 
In the first  case, it  would mean that the unity of sensible knowledge resting on categories is 
assured by the fact that the I think necessarily accompanies each representation of mine. In the 
second case,  it would mean that the unity of knowledge resting on categories is assured by the fact 
that the I think can accompany each representation of mine. 
The first  interpretation, in the style of traditional metaphysics,  founds the unity of knowledge 
upon  the  unconditioned  necessity  of  the  presence  of  self-consciousness.  If  we  accept  this 
interpretation, the task of deduction will  be superfluous. There is no need for us to legitimate the 
use of categories if the I think is always necessarily present, properly structured, together with each 
representation of ours. In the second case, instead, it would follow that unity of knowledge occurs 
according to categories only when it is possible that the I think accompanies each representation of 
mine. 
Surprisingly, Kant uses the curious wording "must be able". The unity of self-consciousness, that 
is, of the substratum within which validity of categories can be discussed and legitimated, is not an 
absolute but a conditioned necessity. In order for the conflict between sceptics and dogmatists to 
take place, i.e. for the very problem of legitimation to be posed, this unity must be possible. Let us 
clarify this statement as follows: if  we wish to reflect on our knowledge, its self-conscious unity 
must be possible. So, conditionally, to obtain unity of self-consciousness, it must be possible that 
the I think accompanies each representation of mine. In summary,  "must" expresses a necessity 
connected with the possibility  of unity of  self-consciousness and does not express an absolute 
necessity (Chiodi 1961, 232-68).  On what condition, let us now ask, is it possible for the I think to 
accompany each representation of mine?
It is, of course, not enough to have representations: in this case consciousness could be reduced 
to an unconscious theatre where perceptions follow one another. But it could not be maintained that 
these representations are unified by the fact that all  of them parade, one after another, on this 
stage. There must be the conscious activity of a spectator to unify them. There must be a subject 
who can succeed in identifying these representations as his own, in giving them a sense and 
consistency by utilizing, for this purpose, the functions of categories. In order to achieve unification, 
it must therefore be possible for the I think to accompany each representation. The I think, though, 
is not an empirical, perceiving subject. For clearly, in this case, nothing could assure the unity of 
knowledge, if by knowledge we mean an inter-subjective heritage. It is a possibility that must be 
presupposed as valid in order that an objective unity of knowledge can be obtained. This unity, in 
short, is not in the object, but rather in a possible subject.
The need, as has been seen, is for transcendental deduction to be derived from a crisis of the 
univocity and indisputability of evidence, inasmuch as rationalism and empiricism presented two 
opposing types of evidence, (one intellectual and the other sensible). In contrast, the critical Kantian 
requirement was expressed by a finite reason, self-given, incapable of denying evidence (intuitions) 
and of reconstructing from itself and by itself a totality that would  be identified with reality. Thus, 
transcendental deduction of categories occurs over categories that are not just concepts of the 
object in general, but which are concepts of intuition in general (Chiodi 1961, 251-57).
To re-state this more clearly, let us resort again to the judicial metaphor. The judge, although 
independent and subject only to the ideal of legislation and systematicity, must take heed only of 
the claims of the parties who have appointed him. Clearly, he is not a legislator/demiurge who 
builds the world ex novo; instead, he is compelled to abide only by what the litigants have submitted 
to him. This is also true in the case of a special constitutional court endeavouring to find a remedy 
for anarchy by settling the dispute among conflicting claims. In short, and in the non-metaphorical 
dimension, Newton's physics and Euclidean geometry (with their concepts of time and space), are 
not the sole forms of cognition possible in their respective realms. The judge who deals with them 
attempts to establish the legitimacy and limits of their claims, should they appear as parties before 
him. However, he by no means rules out that other parties, belonging to the same sphere, may 
bring their  case before  the law.  Think  for  instance of  Einsteinian physics and non-Euclidean 
geometries, which are capable of adducing different and perhaps better reasons.
If categories, and in general any a priori  concepts, are detached from the field in which, in a 
conditioned manner,  they  have validity,  and from the  corresponding conditions  of  validity,  an 
absolute field is not reached. It is simply the case that all meaning and significance are removed 
from their dominion, just as a tribunal legislating in vacuo would be quite meaningless. Hence the 
important role played by schematism, which through figurative synthesis organises the framework of 
categories, in the form of temporal structures.
In conclusion, the critique of reason operates according to a juridical logic in two fundamental 
theses: First,  at no level is reality, as mere presentiality, capable of being valued as foundation. 
(Chiodi 1961, 267). That is, fact does not constitute a right; and second, foundation occurs only 
through its inclusion in structures of possibilities. In the same way, the legal system is a system of 
possibilities. Deduction of any claim whatsoever does not occur, in a jurisdictional sense, by virtue 
of  exhibition of  the fact,  but  rather  through its  inclusion in  a hypothetical  framework;  that  of 
possibilities.
3. Practical reason as a scope of validity.
In the preface to the 1787 edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant addressed the problem of 
the moral sphere, by manifesting the need for a transcendental deduction of the conditions and 
limits on its validity:  "The dogmatism of metaphysics is the real source of the scepticism that is 
opposed to morality".19 In this case too, Kant is confronted with a crisis of evidence, whether it be 
rationalistic  evidence (the  ideal  of  perfection),  or  empiricist  evidence (the  doctrines  of  moral 
sentiment).  Withn  the  moral  sphere,  the  most  remarkable  clue  to  this  crisis  of  evidence  is 
represented by the manner in which Kant treated the ideal of happiness.20
Traditional ethics saw happiness - to wit, full realisation of human potentialities - as its pivotal 
concept. Happiness was the end that oriented and defined moral behaviour as well as the political 
order. Kantian ethics, on the other hand, moved away from the tradition, saying that happiness 
cannot be the foundation of universal and obligatory rules because it  does not have a univocal, 
determinate and evident content. Clearly, in this form, the idea of happiness is an ideal of totality, 
i.e.  as much prosperity as possible. But the content of this ideal is empirical and consequently 
neither evident, nor determinable once and for all. Rather, as regards its ends, happiness depends 
on  the  opinions  of  the  people  concerned,  while  the  means to  achieve  the  ends depend on 
experience, which is inherently particular and contingent.21
In the second place, were everybody to share  the same concept of happiness, we could not rest 
assured that such a concept would give rise to rules capable of possessing inter-subjective value. 
Desiring the same thing does not mean agreement upon the rules of behaviour to be followed. 
There is a quip by Francis I that Kant quotes as an example: "What my brother Charles desires 
(Milan), that I desire too." 22 If law and morality are defined as a body of inter-subjective rules, such 
rules cannot be determined teleologically, even in the exceptional event of an agreement over the 
ends to pursue.
Likewise, the evidence of happiness as the foundation of morality rested on the necessary and 
unconditioned presence of  a  metaphysical  framework:  human nature.  The crisis  of  evidence, 
manifested  by  the  conflict  between rationalism and empiricism,  makes this  path  impassable. 
Further, ethics founded on fact can, at best, furnish a phenomenology of morality. But it cannot offer 
any argument in favour of the obligation of a certain behaviour without falling into contradiction. 
Indeed, if  human nature truly  acted in  an effective  and necessary fashion, it  would be utterly 
superfluous to enunciate the obligation to follow one's own nature, since the naturalistic foundation 
would be operative, always and without possibility of exception.
Similarly,  practical reason,  a fortiori,  does not rest on the ascertation of the presence of an 
unconditioned and necessary actuality.  It  is, rather, a sphere of validity that has as its threshold 
certain conditions of possibility. Therefore the  central issue of practical reason is  how, and under 
what limits, are a priori principles possible, as practical and objective laws?
...the moral law, although it gives no view, yet gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the 
sensible world and the whole compass of the theoretical use of reason, a fact that points to a pure world of 
the understanding, nay, even defines it  positively and enables us to know something of it, i.e. a law [...] 
There are therefore two very distinct problems: how, on the one side, reason can cognise  objects a priori, 
and how on the other side it can be an immediate determining principle of the will23.
Practical reason and theoretical reason differ in their relationship with evidence, with the issue of 
the immediate matter of fact. As regards knowledge, the presence of evidence,  of intuition,  is not 
incompatible  with  legislation  by  reason,  provided  that  some  possible  structures  capable  of 
accounting for it can be worked out and legitimated. But in the case of morality, things are quite 
different. A certain evidence is not to be explained by including it into a structure of possibilities, but 
a structure of rules mist  be planned that do not have to account for the evidence. These are, 
instead,  entrusted  with  the  task  of  sketching  a  possible  world,  entirely  to  be  realised.  This 
framework of rules, set free as it  is from experience, should respect solely those characters by 
which reason is given to itself.  It  should thus be formal, universal and also be such as not to 
contravene its own condition.
Clearly, a legislation of reason is possible if and only if it formulates rules in such a way as to 
respect the possibilities of the will - and consequently the moral subjectivity - of any rational being. 
In other words, these rules must be such that they can be desired as universal laws by and for 
every possible rational being. Moral subjectivity is the acknowledgement of the possibility of making 
free and conscious choices. For instance, a rational being who lies to someone thereby implicitly 
denies the latter's moral subjectivity, for the very reason that the person lied to is deprived of the 
possibility of making a thoroughly conscious choice.
We would expect a transcendental deduction of the framework of moral law, but Kant offers no 
such thing. Instead, he asserts that moral law is a  Faktum der Vernunft24, and that it cannot be a 
matter of experience, because the existence of the moral law cannot be proven empirically. Indeed 
no example of moral behaviour can properly be exhibited, for the simple reason that any moral 
behaviour does not exemplify by its phenomenality, but rather insofar as it  is judged by us in a 
certain perspective. Besides, a behaviour can be morally imputable only on the presupposition that 
it  is  free.  But  the  structures  of  empirical  knowledge  belong  to  the  explanatory  type,  and 
consequently we have no opportunity to know freedom 25 .
This can be re-stated, for the sake of clarity, as follows: we are not thinking of the determinism 
of physical science of Kant's day, but simply of any explanation whatsoever of a historical event. An 
historian endeavouring to give an account of a human behaviour relates it to a set of background 
events that act as its conditioning. If he confined himself to maintaining that such behaviour was 
free, and consequently original and unconditioned in comparison with the past, he would by no 
means compose a historical narration, but merely a loose list of disconnected, nonsensical events.
Thus, the practical sphere is one of validity introduced by the question "What ought I to do?" 
which presupposes freedom as its condition. But is it not the case that the circumstance that moral 
law is a matter of reason lets back in through the window what Kant chased out of the door, 
namely, foundation as presentiality, factuality, unconditioned necessity? After all, Kant begins his 
discourse by saying there is a fact, a duty, for any rational being to behave within the limits of the 
legislation yielded by the autonomy of reason. We might ask ourselves: how can we rest assured 
that such a "fact" possesses an objective value?26
A possible solution to this problem is founded upon the thesis that Kant's practical interests were 
substantially  the following:  First,  to  remove the moral  world  from the type of  conditioning of 
transcendental deduction of pure concepts of understanding, and thus from the logic of explanation; 
second,  to  remove  the  moral  world  from  the  deceptive  unconditionedness  of  metaphysical 
foundation; and third, to found the moral world upon its specific conditions of validity (Chiodi 1961, 
273-79).
In  this  perspective,  the  moral  world  is  not  unconditioned in  absolute  terms,  but  solely  in 
connection with the world of knowledge. And this would be the way of being of a particular type of 
conditioning. In other words, it is not unconditioned in the manner of the old metaphysics: simply, it 
is  theoretically  inexplicable.  This  interpretative thesis  should be substantiated by the fact  that 
practical reason does not at all  explain the totality of the real, merely confining itself  to what a 
rational being must do.
Reason itself,  after all,  is not a presence that is necessary in an unconditioned manner, but 
rather  a  vocation.  Therefore,  reason  is  something  which  remains  beyond  any  possibility  of 
deduction, either in a juridical or a speculative sense of the word.
The fact that critical reason is self-given is its impassable limit. Reason can include everything 
into structures of legitimation, except its own freedom and demand for explanation. Furthermore, 
none of these structures of legitimation are, in themselves, absolutely necessary and actual. Rather, 
their validity,  being introduced through conditions of possibility,  is merely hypothetical. As far as 
morality is concerned, the rational factualness  of the law may be explained as follows: if we wish to 
justify our behaviour within the limits of a rational legislation - whenever such a legislation does not 
coincide with the material sharing in ends and ideals of happiness - then we must at this stage 
presuppose moral law to be a horizon apodictically given, from a theoretical point of view.  In 
general, the limit  of reason is not something external to it,  but neither is it  an arbitrarily traced 
boundary. It is, rather, reason's mere being in existence and its proposition of itself as a vocation, 
which can account for everything, except itself. 27
Abstract
This paper will propose an interpretation of Kant's thought based on an analysis of the well-known 
Kantian metaphor of the "Tribunal of Reason."  By so doing, it will be demonstrated that the activity 
of reason is not foundational, but jurisdictional. The task of reason is not to form the foundation of 
our frameworks of theoretical and practical knowledge, but rather to form their legitimation - not as 
a necessity,  but rather as a possibility.  In addition, it  will  be argued that the non-foundational 
character  of  reason  is  consistent  both  with  its  ultimate  autonomy  and  with  its  established 
proceedings, i.e. the procedure of transcendental deduction. In other words, the non-foundational 
character of reason does not imply that reason itself  is indeterminate and vague (and therefore 
absolutely useless).
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1
. Kant uses the metaphor of the Tribunal of Reason in several of his works. A clear explanation of its meaning can be 
found in the  Preface to the second edition of  Critique of Pure Reason: "Reason, holding in one hand its principles, 
according to which alone concordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent to laws, and in the other hand the 
experiment which it has devised in conformity with these principles, must approach nature in order to be taught by it. It 
must not, however, do so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but of an 
appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated." (Kritik der reinen  
Vernunft, B XIII)
2
. Suffice it to think, for instance, of the debate which opposed Reichenbach (1920), together with all Neo/Positivists 
and logical Empiricists, against the Neo-Kantian Cassirer (1921). The argument at issue was the tenability of Kantian 
gnoseology,  insofar  as it  is  built  upon traditional  arithmetics,  Euclidean geometry  and classical  Galilean-Newtonian 
physics.  Following  the  recent  development  of  pure  mathematics  (set  theory,  mathematical  logic)  of  non-Euclidean 
geometries and Einsteinian relativity,  Reichenbach acknowledged,  in a Kantian fashion, the requirement  of  a priori 
principles and elements in knowledge,  but  denied that these  a priori were given and determined once and for  all. 
Indeed, the contemporary post-modern reading is closer to Reichenbach's than to Cassirer's.
3
. Outstanding examples of this are J.F. Lyotard (1986) in France,  F. Kaulbach (1982, 1985) in Germany and O. O'Neil 
(1989, 1992a, 1992b) in England. 
4
.  For other perspectives on this subject see J.L. Nancy (1983, 35-60) and also W. Kutschmann (1988).
5
. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 8, 1049 b 10 ff.
6
. I. Kant, Was heißt sich Im Denken orientieren?, AK VIII, 131 ff. 
7
.I. Kant, Kritik del praktischen Vernunft, AK 173-174. Kant, of course, used this simile to separate his own concept of 
freedom from that of  Leibniz.  Since a  spiritual  automaton  is  determined by representations rather  than by material 
causes, it is in no way freer than a material automaton. Its freedom is, in fact, the freedom of a roasting spit.
8
. Consider the famous passage of the Critique of Pure Reason in which unconditioned necessity is called "the veritable 
abyss" for human reason. Now, unconditioned necessity is inherent in what is an ultimate unavoidable foundation, from 
which it is impossible to deviate; but one cannot help thinking: "What is it that founds the foundation?". This is also true 
for  anyone  wishing  to  read  Kantian  reason  in  an  idealistic  fashion.  The  fact  that  reason  cannot  do  without  self-
presupposition in its own autonomy is not, properly speaking, a foundation, but rather a chasm. The fact that reason 
cannot get out of itself does not entail its identity with the totality of reality (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 641-A 613)
9
. I. Kant. Logik, AK 25-26
10
. I. Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? AK 483.
11
. An argument of this sort was suggested by an Italian philosopher, Pietro Chiodi (1961), who was  known mainly  for  
his studies on Heidegger and existentialism. Chiodi's theses did not only anticipate contemporary debate by several 
years, but also tackled these difficulties successfully. Chiodi's reading of Kant will be duly borne in mind throughout the 
course of  this paper.  In fact,  the goal  is to show the linkage between the non-foudational  activity of  reason and a 
determined procedure, i.e. transcendental deduction. And this linkage may be viewed as a direct by-product of Chiodi's 
interpretation of Kant. 
12
 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 116/B 117-A 84.
13
  Among them, causality deserves to be mentioned as a pivotal function of scientific reasoning .
14l  See, on this subject, Pera (1982).
15
. G.W.F. Hegel, Enc., I, § 42.
16
. Chiodi  (1961, 49-52),  cfr. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, AK XV-XVI.
17
. AK X 129-135. Chiodi, (1961,. 69-75).
18
. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft , B 131; Chiodi, (1961, 232- 268).
19
. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft , B XXX.
20
. For example, see Forschner (1988).
21
. This topic is treated in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.
22
. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AK 50 (It. version  p. 35).
23
. Ibidem, AK 74 and 77.
24
. Ibidem, AK 55-56.
25
. Ibidem, AK 80-87.
26
. See, on the subject,  S. Landucci (1990) who maintains that Kant, within the moral scope, is in the final analysis an  
intuitionist, because in his thought, the structure of morality effectively rests on fact, upon a matter of reason, hence 
upon something that reason assumes as immediately certain and incontestable
27
. The present text is a revision of a paper presented at the Seminar Nuove prospettive interpretative della razionalità  
pratica, held by Ms Barbara Henry - to whom  my special thanks are due - at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna of Pisa, 
during the Academic Year 1993-94.
